CIA, DoD, and Other Foreign Intelligence Involvement

Important Note (as of July 27, 2025, 07:45 China Standard Time): I still have at least between 20 and 50 important entries to add to the “Timeline of Events and Open Letters” section.

It was only on April 28, 2025, that I began publishing the still partially redacted version of the complaint I filed with the U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General, along with other related documents.

The timeline is currently cluttered with entries that are no longer the most important, but I intend to leave them as part of the record. Starting from July 27, 2025, 07:45 China Standard Time, I will try my best to document 100 percent of my communications with anyone directly or indirectly related to this case. For transparency, I will publish as much as possible, although I may redact certain names from public view, especially the identities of confirmed or suspected U.S. intelligence operatives currently operating in the People’s Republic of China.

My first priority is to add several key events to the timeline. My second priority is to create two sub-timelines:

  1. A detailed chronological listing of all events
  2. A condensed version summarizing the case in nine or fewer main events, to help readers quickly grasp the core facts, while allowing those who are interested to explore further

In the meantime, if you are interested in the involvement of U.S. intelligence in this case, you may want to review the following documents:

Although many documents are still missing, this early communication may provide insight:

As for China, I began writing a thread on X (formerly Twitter) that I have not yet finished and may never fully complete. You can read it here: 🔗 https://x.com/ECtHRwatch/status/1938917271365091426

In point 11 of that thread, I mention a significant event, which could of course be a coincidence. On April 8, a military aircraft, an Airbus A319 from the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), 34th Air Division, landed in Taiyuan. This occurred one day after I published this post: 🔗 https://x.com/ECtHRwatch/status/1909246381211959381

Then, on May 30, 2025, Chinese authorities visited me at my home and asked me to close a website that had been active since 2022 without any prior issue. Two out of the four men who came were dressed in civilian clothing. One of them appeared confused when I asked for his badge number. I suspect he may be working for the Ministry of State Security or Chinese military counter-espionage. However, he claimed during a phone call on March 23, 2025, that he was with the Entry-Exit Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

If you go back to this post: 🔗 https://x.com/ECtHRwatch/status/1940564931117797818 you will start to understand how this may all be connected.

My wife and I lived within the residential compound of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) Shanxi Committee Organ Apartments (山西省政协机关公寓). This location is historically linked to a scandal that shook China in 2012. It is reportedly connected to the death of Ling Gu (令谷), the son of Ling Jihua (令计划), who died in a Ferrari crash in March 2012, at a time when his father was serving as chief of staff to President Hu Jintao.

Ling Jihua’s older brother, Ling Zhengce (令政策), also held a senior position in the CPPCC at the provincial level in Shanxi. This makes their family’s political influence in the region quite clear.

Their youngest brother, Ling Wancheng (令完成), fled to the United States during Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption crackdown. According to credible sources, he took with him highly sensitive Chinese government secrets. While his brothers fell, he defected and betrayed China.

The first sentence of that article reads: “The younger brother of the disgraced former presidential aide Ling Jihua (令计划) has reportedly defected to the United States and revealed some of China’s biggest state secrets – including those surrounding its nuclear weapons.”

Perhaps all of this is a coincidence. But if you read carefully the complaint I filed with the DoD OIG, ask yourself how likely it is that there are so many coincidences.

The most important admission, for me personally, came when Subject Number 2, a confirmed U.S. intelligence operative, acknowledged his role during our meeting in Taiyuan on July 14, 2023. I fully understand that this is, at this stage, my word against his. He could backpedal at any time, just as Subject Number 1 eventually did. But I know what happened. I know what he said. And I know the risks that my wife and I were exposed to as a result.

At the time of this writing, I still want to believe that not all American intelligence operatives are bad people. Maybe each country’s intelligence operatives are simply doing their job, and part of that job is to ask others to betray their own country.

However, I currently believe that some individuals within the U.S. intelligence community may have betrayed the American people. By “American people,” I also include American businesses, even though they are legal entities and not human beings. What happens next in the United States is an open question. It is possible that the U.S. intelligence community initially failed to realize that McDonald’s had also defrauded American citizens and American companies.

As for France, I currently believe, based on the evidence I have, that acts of corruption, at least passive corruption, and more seriously, potential acts of treason as defined by the French Penal Code, have likely been committed by high-level officials and magistrates. As a result, I intend to lodge a criminal complaint against unknown persons for corruption and treason. This complaint is intended to trigger an investigation into the role of French intelligence operatives who were aware of the situation, as well as the ministers and possibly the President of France, who, in my view, probably knew as well.

I sometimes feel that intelligence operatives are cold, soulless monsters. I have struggled deeply with the question of whether they are good people or bad people, or whether, as is more likely, some are good and some are not.